tended to jam). Once users became familiar with the QWERTY pattern, manufacturers rightly feared there would be little demand for a new keyboard-even for the Dvorak system, which dramatically increased typing speed. 4 New measures of the value of nonmarket production represent an expansion of the traditional conceptual keyboard, offering not greater speed but greater scope in the measurement of economic output.
This article explores that offer by applying expanded concepts of the labor force and its output to the historical picture of economic growth in the United States between 1800 and 1860. We first examine the evolution of concepts of real product, emphasizing how the nineteenthcentury appreciation of household services was gradually supplanted by an emphasis on marketed output and a tendency to limit household imputations to home manufactures. We then briefly review the historical evidence regarding housewives' activities, suggesting that the demand for their services expanded even as the demand for homeproduced goods fell. Finally, we construct a set of conjectural estimates of the nonmarket labor force, its sectoral allocation, and its product per worker between 1800 and 1860. These estimates build on the sectoral productivity model developed by Paul David and on the labor force estimates developed by Stanley Lebergott and Thomas Weiss.
CONCEPTS OF "REAL PRODUCT"
Definitions of economic output, like the QWERTY keyboard, gained acceptance as the result of a number of interrelated but decentralized decisions. The decisions of census bureaus in the United States and Great Britain had an important impact. The U.S. Census never included women primarily engaged in "keeping house" among the gainfully occupied. However, between 1851 and 1881, British censuses placed such women in an occupational category alongside other productive workers-distinctly separate from the "unoccupied," "unproductive," or "dependent" classes. Between 1875 and 1905, the state census of Massachusetts followed similar conventions. 6 The housewife's work was officially deemed productive, and married women without a listed gainful occupation were not automatically assumed to be housewives. Some were described as "having nothing to do but superintend the households," and there were those who did even less than that. In 1875, there were "4,786 wives of heads simply ornamental" (these, however, amounted to less than 2 percent of all wives).
By the end of the nineteenth century new conventions had been adopted, though not without controversy. The Association for the Advancement of Women formally protested U.S. federal census terminology in 1878, complaining that housewives were "not even incidentally named as in any wise affecting the causes of increase or decrease of population or wealth." 8 National income accounts followed a similar pattern. In the first edition of his Essay on the Progress of Nations Ezra Seaman included an estimate of the value of ordinary domestic labor along with other services, education, amusements, and government. 9 In the 1852 edition, however, he changed his mind, explaining his allegiance to the Smithian doctrine of unproductive labor.
10
Between 1920 and 1940 two major studies estimated the value of housewives' services.
11 After 1940, however, a different consensus emerged, which affirmed the qualitative importance of nonmarket household labor but largely disregarded its quantitative dimensions. Simon Kuznets, an enormously important contributor to the modern system of accounts, constantly reminded his readers that nonmarket labor was important to economic welfare, but he questioned its relevance to the measurement of growth. He remained skeptical of the merits of imputing its value or studying its dimensions in more detail.
12
Most economic historians have followed Kuznets's lead. 13 Only recently has new research on household production and women's nonmarket work generated widespread interest in methods of imputation.
14

HOUSEHOLD-PRODUCED GOODS AND SERVICES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Women's productive activities in the home always extended far beyond home "manufactures," but the expansion of factory-produced textiles and other commodities in the early nineteenth century almost certainly increased the relative importance of services. Indeed, one could argue that the much-vaunted transition from manufacturing to services took place first within the home. The widespread popularity of books instructing women in new standards of housekeeping and household "management" attests to the demand for high-quality household 8 U.S. Congress services, as does the rapid growth of the paid employment of domestic servants.
15
Attention to the nineteenth-century household as a unit of production has traditionally focused on the types of household manufactures (primarily textile goods) documented by Tench Coxe in 1810 and tabulated by the U.S. censuses between 1840 and I860. 16 Recent research has broadened the picture to include women's significant contributions to marketed and consumed agricultural output on farmsparticularly milk, butter, and garden produce-in the early nineteenth century.
17 Even more noteworthy are new historical accounts of demand for women's services in the management of the household, preparation of meals, and care of children and other dependents. Technological change often led to higher-quality products rather than a reduction in labor time-as with improved milling of grain, which contributed to the substitution of time-consuming yeast breads for earlier quick breads based on coarser flour.
18
Massachusetts census data offer some useful indicators of the extent of services that women provided as wives, mothers, sisters, and daughters. In 1885, only 28.6 percent of women 14 years and older had a listed gainful occupation, compared with 85.7 percent of men. But when women providing household services to family members were included, 89.3 percent of all women in this age category were workers.
19 By the conventional federal standards, only 11.8 percent of workers were engaged in "domestic and personal service"; but by Massachusetts's more inclusive standards, 41.8 percent of all workers were in the service sector. By the "gainful" workers criterion, "manufacturing and mechanical" industries were predominant, comprising 48.3 percent of the work force. By the broader "work" criterion, those industries engaged only 30.9 percent. One important implication is that trends in productivity in domestic and personal services could easily have influenced total labor productivity more than trends in the traditionally emphasized agricultural and manufacturing sectors.
These estimates understate married women's participation in market work, which extended well beyond wage labor to include performing industrial homework, taking in boarders and lodgers, and contributing to the output of family farms or enterprises.
20 They also obscure the fact that most women who engaged in market work continued to devote substantial time to household production, as did many men. Still, the figures lend specificity to the analysis of household services. What varied across states and over time was women's participation in market work, probably not their productive work in general.
Many women who described themselves as housewives probably enjoyed substantial amounts of leisure, particularly if they had domestic servants. By the same token, many men who described themselves as farmers or capitalists were primarily engaged in overseeing the labor of others. Indeed, the assumption that women provided approximately the same amount of labor as men probably understates their contribution, as many contemporary time-budget studies show that women work significantly longer hours, overall, than men.
CONJECTURAL ESTIMATES OF NONMARKET WORKERS AND PER CAPITA PRODUCTS
Scholars have long recognized that measures of market output and its growth over time are only loosely related to changes in the standard of living, which is shaped by factors such as nutrition, health, and the quality of the social and natural environment. The value of nonmarket goods and services looms large as another important component of the standard of living, one well worth empirical scrutiny. 22 Although the lack of data requires conjectural estimates based on stylized assumptions, it is not obvious that these are any more speculative than many other estimates that have graced debates over U.S. economic growth before 1860. In any case, systematic speculation is clearly warranted when it can serve as an impetus to empirical research.
The Labor Force
The size of the nonmarket labor force can be approximated using assumptions quite similar to those employed in estimates of the paid labor force during this period. Weiss estimated the paid labor force of free males 16 and over by applying a labor force participation rate of 90 percent to this category of the population for 1800 to 1860. Similarly, he applied a labor force participation rate of 21 percent for boys aged 10 to 15. Because he is critical of census-based estimates of women's market participation, which show a very uneven pattern of increase, he substituted a set of estimates based on the assumption that the labor force participation rate of women 16 and older increased from 7.6 percent in 1800 to 11.3 percent in 1860, whereas that of girls aged 10 to 15 remained constant at 6.8 percent from 1800 to 1850 and then decreased to 6.6 percent.
23
Similar reasoning can be used to construct a measure of the number of workers engaged primarily in nonmarket work. Our earlier discussion of the Massachusetts census data suggests that free women were just as likely to engage in productive work as free men, though far less likely to engage in market work. Therefore, we can construct a measure of the total (market and nonmarket) free female work force by applying the free male labor force participation rates to the female population. The size of the nonmarket female work force is the difference between the total (market and nonmarket) work force and the number engaged in market employment.
The growth of these components of the total free work force between 1800 and 1860 is shown in Table 1 . The nonmarket component declined relative to the free paid work force with the increase in women's participation in paid employment. Yet it grew significantly in absolute terms. Moreover, it grew more rapidly than the population. The number of nonmarket workers per capita increased from about. 18 to about .20, while the number of market workers (free and slave) per capita increased from about .32 to about .36 over the period. Changes in the age structure of the population wrought by immigration and early fertility decline compensated for the "loss" of nonmarket workers to the market sector.
Sectoral Composition
A great deal of attention has been focused on the allocation of the paid labor force between farm and nonfarm employment between 1800 and 1860, partly because this allocation provided the basis for Paul David's exploration of the pace of economic growth during the period. 24 How should the nonmarket workers we are counting be allocated in terms of sectors? They could be assigned to a single sector of their own, the "household sector," but it seems likely that nonmarket production in farming differed considerably from that which took place off the farm: the activities of wives, mothers, and daughters were strongly influenced by the activities of the paid male workers they lived with and cared for. Their productivity was affected by their access to land, livestock, and other inputs into the production of food, as well as by methods of obtaining water and of gathering and using fuel. All these factors probably varied between farm and nonfarm households.
The total of nonmarket women workers can be allocated between farm and nonfarm in the same proportion as the free paid labor force, on the assumption that most lived where the market income earner in their family lived. Table 2 displays the results in percentage terms, based on Weiss's estimates of farm/nonfarm composition of the free labor force for 1800, 1830, and I860. 25 The free paid labor force shifted out of agriculture more rapidly than the total paid labor force, which included slaves. As a result, the share of the total (market and nonmarket) labor force employed on farms declined slightly more (from 74.3 to 53.8 percent) over the period than the share of the market labor force employed on farms (from 74.3 to 55.7 percent). The shift in nonmarket work from farm to nonfarm settings probably had a significant effect on the economy as a whole, resulting in an increased demand for purchased food as opportunities for producing for personal consumption declined. It may also have increased the overall productivity of household services such as making purchases and fetching water and fuel, which were probably affected favorably by urban economies of scale.
One shortcoming of this sectoral allocation, also relevant to the labor force estimates described earlier, is that farm women who engaged primarily in nonmarket work probably also devoted substantial time and effort to activities that increased the value of market output. 26 The allocation presented in Table 2 may understate the role of farm market labor relative to farm nonmarket labor. This raises doubts regarding conventional estimates of agricultural output per worker, constructed by dividing the gross value of agricultural output by the number of market workers engaged in agriculture. Because the number of market workers in agriculture underestimates total labor inputs into marketed output by a significant amount, farm productivity is overstated. "Hidden" market work in the nonfarm sector is less likely to distort measures of output per worker there. If the "hidden" labor inputs remained constant, trends would remain unaffected, but there is reason to believe that these inputs declined over time as young children increasingly attended school and women moved into paid employment. Product per labor hour on farms may well have risen faster than existing series indicate.
Per Capita Output
Estimates of the growth of per capita product in the United States between 1800 and 1860 have been based largely on assumptions regarding the size of the labor force, its sectoral composition, and product per worker in farm and nonfarm employment. Lack of accurate data on product per worker makes assumptions here particularly conjectural. Paul David presented estimates based on the assumption that productivity in nonagricultural employment was a constant multiple of productivity in agricultural employment, set by reference to one point in the period, the 1839/40 census year. Slaves and free workers were treated the same. 27 In more recent research, Weiss utilized a similar methodology, substituting more detailed, disaggregated estimates that alter the trajectory of growth in per capita output.
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Although both David and Weiss limited their attention to the market sector, a similar methodology can be used to generate lower-and upper-bound estimates of the value of nonmarket production. The following estimates build on Weiss's assumptions and estimates of per capita market product and employ three alternative sets of assumptions that resemble those deployed in debates over the growth of market product. 29 26 Craig's analysis of a matched sample of rural households from the 1860 censuses of agriculture and population suggests that the contribution of adult women to marketed farm output in the Northeast amounted to approximately the wage of a male hired hand for seven or eight months, equivalent to about .52 the output of an adult male. Indeed, Craig notes that if women also provided household services equal in value to those of a full-time domestic wage worker, their total contribution exceeded that of men. See Craig, "The Value of Household Labor." 27 David, " T h e Growth of Real Product," p . 160. 28 Weiss, "Economic Growth Before 1860." 29 Estimates based on David's assumptions are available from the authors upon request. The
CASE 1: ASSUMING CONSTANT PRODUCT PER PERSON IN THE FARM NONMARKET AND NONFARM NONMARKET SECTORS
Lack of attention to nonmarket production of goods and services is consistent with the often implicit assumption that no important technological changes or shifts in supply or demand take place there. The implications of this assumption can be explored by setting product per person in nonmarket production in the farm and nonfarm sectors equal to some constant amount over the entire period, representing fulfillment of a constant, unchanging need for household services.
Weiss estimated agricultural output per worker equal to $156 (in constant 1840 dollars) in 1830. In 1832, the wages of a female domestic servant were equivalent to about .6 of the wages of agricultural workers. 30 Applying the same proportion to output per worker yields a farm nonmarket output per farm nonmarket worker of $93.60. In the same year, the wages of a domestic servant were equivalent to about .405 of those of a manufacturing worker. 31 Weiss calculated that nonfarm output per worker was 2.31 times greater than farm output over the period. Multiplying these two figures, we set nonfarm, nonmarket output per worker at .94 of agricultural output per worker in 1830, or $145.95.
Multiplying these benchmarks times the numerical estimates and sectoral allocations presented earlier yields a very low estimate of the value of nonmarket services, ranging from $19 per capita in 1800 to $24 per capita in 1860 (see Table 3 , case 1). Its value grows over time only as a result of changes in the age structure of the population and the shift from nonmarket farm to nonmarket, nonfarm work, and it represents a declining share of total (market and nonmarket) output per capita. Total output per capita grew 62.4 percent over the entire period, relative to 71.2 percent for market production alone. Decadal growth rates are similar for market and total output per capita, largely driven by changes in estimated market farm output per worker.
CASE 2: ASSUMING THAT PRODUCT PER WORKER IN NONMARKET SECTORS IS LOWER THAN IN MARKET SECTORS BUT INCREASES AT THE SAME RATE
This estimate uses the same benchmarks described in case 1 but treats them as a proportion of the changing levels of output per worker in the farm and nonfarm sectors, implying identical rates of productivity increase in market and nonmarket sectors. The result (see Table 3 , case 2) is a more rapid rate of growth in the value of nonmarket production per capita, from $20 in 1800 to $34 in 1860. Nonmarket production remains virtually constant at about 22 percent of the value of total comparisons between market output per capita and total output per capita in cases 1 to 3 are quite similar. 30 production. Total output per capita grows 71.0 percent, about the same as for market production.
CASE 3: ASSUMING THAT PRODUCT PER WORKER IN NONMARKET SECTORS IS THE SAME AS IN MARKET SECTORS AND INCREASES AT THE SAME RATE
Relative wages in the market sector are not a very good measure of the productivity of nonmarket workers relative to market workers. Apart from the obvious problem of selection bias (women who work for a wage may be less productive than others in nonmarket work), discrimination against women in the market sector lowers their wages relative to those of men. An additional factor is the possibility that lower product per hour in household production may be counterbalanced by longer total hours of work in the household, raising product per person relative to market production.
As an upper-bound estimate, consider the possibility that nonmarket product per person was equivalent in value to market production per person in the corresponding market sector (see Table 3 , case 3). Not surprisingly, nonmarket production comprises a larger share of total production than in the other two cases. It also increases as a share of the total, because the shift from farm to nonfarm is more rapid for nonmarket workers (none of whom were slaves) than for the paid labor force as a whole. In this case, total product per capita increases 76.3 percent over the period, slightly more than market product per capita. The sectoral reallocation means that the market growth rate underestimates the total growth rate even though rates of productivity growth are the same. A similar trend would be evident even if a share of nonmarket farm workers were allocated to the market farm worker sector. If this share changed over time, however, none of these estimates of market or nonmarket product per worker would be valid. Comparisons between cases 1 to 3 and the growth rate of market output per capita based on Weiss's calculations are provided in Table 3 . The most visible differences between market and total output per capita pertain to levels rather than trends, simply because productivities in all sectors were linked.
We consider case 3 to be the best feasible estimate of total output per capita. Even though it is based on the farm/nonfarm allocation used by Weiss, it obviates the market/nonmarket distinction in both sectors by setting output per worker of both types equal. The most unsatisfactory feature of case 3 is its reliance on the conventional series regarding output per worker in farm and nonfarm sectors, and the related assumption that nonmarket workers were more productive off the farm than on it; but this provides a basis for comparison with similar estimates of market output per capita. The most interesting feature is that total output grows more than market output over the period, counter to conventional assumptions that inclusion of nonmarket output in the total always slows measured growth.
CONCLUSION
Economists have never been completely happy with estimates of output that ignore nonmarket work. Nineteenth-century census data provide an empirical basis for estimating the size of the nonmarket labor force and its per capita output. Whether or not these estimates are included in measures of total output and growth, they are certainly relevant to debates over trends in the standard of living. Additional empirical research is sorely needed but is unlikely to proceed very rapidly unless economists concede the limitations of an accounting system that ignores the productive efforts of most adult women.
Like keyboard operators who have many years of experience touchtyping with QWERTY, economists have invested a great deal of human capital in learning and developing a system for measuring market output. The transition to a broader accounting system will doubtless be awkward and expensive. But in this case, more than mere efficiency is at stake. Further efforts to impute the value of nonmarket household services could enrich our understanding of economic growth. Surely economic historians will be more willing than typists to pay the costs of developing and applying an alternative conceptual keyboard, if they judge it useful.
